Many hands make hard work, or why agriculture is not a puzzle by Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Many hands make hard work, or why
agriculture is not a puzzle
Ricardo Andre´s Guzma´n
Escuela de Administracio´n, Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile
28. January 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9607/
MPRA Paper No. 9607, posted 17. July 2008 00:55 UTC
The Neolithic Revolution from a
price-theoretical perspective
Ricardo A. Guzmán
Ponticia Universidad Católica de Chile
Escuela de Administración
rnguzman@uc.cl
July 15, 2008
Abstract
The adoption of agriculture, some 10,000 years ago, triggered the rst
demographic explosion in human history. When fertility fell back to its
original level, early farmers found themselves worse fed than the previous
hunter-gatherers, and worked longer hours to make ends meet. I develop
a price-theoretical model with endogenous fertility that rationalizes these
events. The results are driven by the reduction in the cost of children that
followed the adoption of agriculture.
1 Introduction
The shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture, or Neolithic Revolution
(10,000 to 5,000 B.P.), was followed by a sharp increase in fertility (Bocquet-
Appel, 2002). In the course of few centuries, typical communities grew from
about 30 individuals to 300 or more, and population densities increased from
less than one hunter-gatherer per square mile, to 20 or more farmers on the
same surface (Johnson and Earle, 2000, pp. 43, 125, 246).
This demographic explosion has been attributed to two causes. First, food
was available to early farmers in unprecedented quantities (Price and Gebauer,
1995). Second, children were much cheaper for early farmers than for hunter-
gatherers: caring for children interfered with hunting-and-gathering, but not
with farming, and the children of early farmers contributed to food production
(Kramer and Boone 2002).
Although farmers produced food in large quantities, their nutrition was
poorer than the nutrition of hunter-gatherers (Armelagos et al., 1991; Cohen
and Armelagos, 1984). To make matters worse, working time increased as
a result of the adoption of agriculture: ethnographical studies indicate that
hunter-gatherers worked less that six hours per day, whereas primitive horti-
culturists worked seven hours on average, and intensive agriculturalists worked
nine (Sackett 1996, pp. 33842).
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I develop a price-theoretical model with endogenous fertility that rationalizes
these events. In my model, a tribe of hunter-gatherers discovers agriculture and
adopts it because doing so increases the return to labor and reduces the price
of children. When population restabilizes, the later generations consume less
food and work longer hours than their hunter-gatherer predecessors. Still, they
choose to remain farmers because reverting to hunting and gathering would
make them even worse o¤.
These results are driven by the fall in the price of children. Enhancements in
the food production technology have only one e¤ect in the long-run: increasing
population.
2 Related literature
Previous explanations to the loss of welfare that followed the Neolithic Revolu-
tion include the following.
In Weisdorfs (2004) model, early farmers give away leisure in exchange
for goods produced by an emerging class of specialists (e.g., craftsmen and
bureaucrats). Marceau and Myers (2006) model the fall in consumption and
leisure as a tragedy of the commons. Both Weisdorf, and Marceau and Myers
assume a constant population during the transition to agriculture.
Weisdorf (2007) and Robson (2008) incorporate demographics to their mod-
els. Weisdorf combines Malthusian population principles with the evolution of
human metabolic rates. In his model, agriculture favored the evolution of hu-
mans better suited for longer hours of work. Robson develops a model with two
goods: children and their health. Infectious diseases become more prevalent
as population increases. This makes the health of children more expensive, so
farmers choose to invest less on it.
3 A model of agriculture adoption
3.1 Model setup
A tribe has N > 0 identical adult members or tribesmen. Each tribesman
chooses food consumption c > 0, leisure r > 0, and quantity of children n > 0
in order to maximize utility. His is subject to the following budget constraint:
w (T   r + n)  c+ n
Variable w > 0 is the return to labor in units of food, T > 0 is the tribesmans
disposable time, and T   r > 0 is his labor supply. Parameter   0 represents
child productivity measured in man-hours. The children of hunter-gatherers
dont contribute to production:  = 0. When agriculture is adopted,  rises to
a positive amount. Parameter  > 0 measures the food requirements of a child.
The budget constraint can be rewritten as follows
I  c+ prr + pnn; (1)
2
where I = wT is total income, pr = w is the price of leisure, and pn =  w > 0
is the price of children.
The return to labor w is a function of a technology parameter A and of
population N . As usual, w is increasing in A. Following Malthus, assume
w falls with N . Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives: wA > 0 and
wN < 0.
Population dynamics is governed by the following equation:
N 0 =
nN
n
;
where N 0 is next periods adult population, and parameter n > 0 represents the
replacement fertility rate.
In the short-run, population N is xed, while in the long-run, diminishing
returns to labor operate as a Malthusian check: as population grows, the return
to labor declines, until the tribesmans optimal decision is to bear just enough
children to keep population constant (n = n).
Finally, let the tribesman choices be summarized by his Marshallian de-
mands:
c = cm (pr; pn; I);
r = rm (pr; pn; I);
n = nm(pr; pn; I):
3.2 Comparative statics
The e¤ects of an increase in children productivity
Totally di¤erentiating w and the Marshallian demands we obtain a linear system
for the e¤ects of a rise in :
w = wNN; (2)
c = c
m
pr w + c
m
pn ( w   w) + cmI wT; (3)
r = r
m
pr w + r
m
pn ( w   w) + rmI wT; (4)
n = n
m
pr w|{z}
dpr
d
+ nmpn( w   w)| {z }
dpn
d
+ nmI wT|{z}
dI
d
; (5)
where w, c, r, n, and N are unknowns; and subscripted, roman letters de-
note total derivatives. The system is closed with Nsr = 0 for the short-run, and
with nlr = 0 for the long-run, where superscripts sr and lr distinguish short-
run and long-run solutions. We search for conditions that su¢ ce to reproduce
the stylized facts of the Neolithic revolution: a short-run fertility rise, long-run
falls in food consumption and leisure, and a long-run increase in population.
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Initially, the tribesman hunts an gathers, so  = 0. Replacing  = 0 in
equations (3)(5), we get:
c = (c
m
pr + c
m
I T )w   wcmpn ; (6)
r = (r
m
pr + r
m
I T )w   wrmpn ; (7)
n = (n
m
pr + n
m
I T )w   wnmpn . (8)
From equations (2) and (6)(8), plus condition Nsr = 0 we obtain:
csr =  wcmpn ; (9)
rsr =  wrmpn ; (10)
nsr =  wnmpn ; (11)
Equation (11) tells us that fertility will increase in the short-run when  in-
creases if the demand for children is negatively sloping: nmpn < 0. Equations (9)
and (10) imply consumption and leisure will fall if they are gross substitutes of
children: cmpn ; r
m
pn > 0.
Should the tribesman adopt agriculture? Yes. Adopting agriculture in-
creases , which brings pn down, hence pushing the tribesmans budget con-
strain outwards and unambiguously increasing his utility.
From equations (2) and (6)(8), plus condition nlr = 0 we get the long run
comparative statics:
wlr =
wnmpn
nmpr + n
m
I T
; (12)
clr =
cmpr + c
m
I T
nmpr + n
m
I T
wnmpn   wcmpn ; (13)
rlr =
rmpr + r
m
I T
nmpr + n
m
I T
wnmpn   wrmpn ; (14)
Nlr =
wnmpn
wN (nmpr + n
m
I T )
(15)
Finally, from equations (9)(11) and (12)(15) we derive a set of su¢ cient con-
ditions for nsr > 0; c
sr
 ; r
sr
 ; c
lr
 ; r
lr
 < 0, and N
lr
 > 0:
1. The return to labor is decreasing in the population: wN < 0:
2. The Marshallian demand for children is negatively sloping: nmpn < 0.
3. The demand for children is increasing in the return to labor: nw = nmpr +
TnmI > 0:
4. Consumption is a normal good and a gross complement of leisure and
children: cmI > 0, c
m
pr ; c
m
pn > 0:
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5. Leisure is a gross complement of children: rmpn > 0:
6. Leisure is decreasing in the return to labor: rw = rmpr + r
m
I T < 0:
7. Leisure is more sensitive to changes in the return to labor than to changes
in the price if children: jrmpr + rmI T j > rmpn .
8. Fertility is more sensitive to changes in the price of children than to
changes in the return to labor: nmpr + n
m
I T < jnmpn j.
Latter generations of farmers will not abandon agriculture, because that
would increase the price of children, reducing their welfare in the short run.
The e¤ects of enhancements in the food production technology
Totally di¤erentiating w and the Marshallian demands with respect to A, and
imposing  = 0, we obtain:
wA = wA + wNNA;
cA = c
m
pr wA + c
m
I wAT;
rA = r
m
pr wA + r
m
I wAT;
nA = n
m
prwA + n
m
I wAT
where wA, cA, rA, NA, and nA are unknowns. The system is closed with NA = 0
for the short-run, and with nA = 0 and n = n for the long-run. Under the
conditions stated in the previous section, the solutions to this system are:
csrA = c
m
pr wA + c
m
I wAT > 0; c
lr
A = 0
rsrA = r
m
pr wA + r
m
I wAT < 0; r
lr
A = 0
nsrA = n
m
prwA + n
m
I wAT > 0; N
lr
A =  
wA
wN
> 0:
It follows that fertility and consumption rise in the short-run, leisure falls in the
short-run, and the only long-run e¤ect of a larger A is an increase in population.
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